Eyetracking results show how people comprehend counterfactual conditionals

Isabel Orenes and colleagues showed how people comprehend the dual nature of counterfactual conditionals, i.e., how process separate a fact from a counterfactual possibility. Their results were recently published in Frontiers of Psychology, and the abstract is here:...

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People make systematic errors when reasoning about durations

Laura Kelly presented new research on reasoning about durations at the 2019 London Reasoning Workshop. The abstract of her talk is here: Few experiments have examined how people reason about durative relations, e.g., “during”. Such relations pose...

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A stochastic algorithm for causal reasoning

Gordon Briggs and Sunny Khemlani published a new computational model of causal reasoning in the International Conference of Cognitive Modeling, which they used to model data from a replication and extension of Wolff and Barbey (2015). Here’s...

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Meta-analysis on conditional reasoning

Marco Ragni, Hannah Dames, and Phil Johnson-Laird recently published a new meta-analysis on conditional reasoning at the International Conference on Cognitive Modeling. Here’s the abstract: Conditional premises are assertions with “if”, e.g., If I have measles, then...

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New paper in T&R about the abstract representation of conditionals

Henry Markovits, Pier-Luc de Chantal, and Janie Brisson of UQAM recently published a paper in Thinking & Reasoning about the abstract mental representation of basic conditionals. Their abstract is here: Studies examining the interpretation that is given...

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Research on mental models featured at the London Reasoning Workshop

This year’s London Reasoning Workshop featured new research on mental models and reasoning. The speakers included: Phil Johnson-Laird and Marco Ragni: “You can do that! Possibilities, permissions, and prohibitions” Monica Bucciarelli and Phil Johnson-Laird: “People should interrupt...

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New paper on why machines can’t reason yet

A major failure of current AI systems is that they can’t mimic common sense reasoning: most ML systems don’t reason, and all theorem provers draw trivial and silly deductions. We analyze why — and suggest a path...

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People love moral statements they believe; hate those they disbelieve

Monica Bucciarelli and Phil Johnson-Laird have several new articles on deontic and moral reasoning. First, they published a paper and a reply to comments in the Italian legal journal, Materiali Per Una Storia Della Cultura Giuridica. The abstract...

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Thinking is founded on models of possibilities: An interview with Johnson-Laird

Marco Ragni recently interviewed Phil Johnson-Laird for an article in KI – Künstliche Intelligenz. Here’s a small excerpt from the interview: MR: From your perspective—what are current limitations of AI approaches to explain human reasoning? PJL: When...

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Interview with Philip Johnson-Laird in The Reasoner

Hykel Hosni recently interviewed Phil Johnson-Laird in the latest issue of The Reasoner. Here’s a short excerpt: HH: How about probabilistic reasoning? PJL: The idea that probabilities enter into reasoning is quite popular at the moment: theorists want...

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